The 67 Lines Aren't Technically "Indefensible" but....

Jeffrey Goldberg had a good catch on the line about the "Israeli" blockade in the Times.

But in a previous posting, he wrote that the 1967 lines weren't indefensible because despite having them, Israel won the Six Day War. 

That isn't exactly the case.

In 1967 Israel made a pre-emptive strike, taking the fight to its enemies before they had a chance to attack Israel itself. It was because of this quick action that Israel won and the 67 lines didn't prove to be a problem. However, in 1973, when Israel failed to act preemptively, it was attacked and took nearly a month to fight off Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Israel was able to absorb the attacks because most of the fighting was done in the Sinai and the Golan, not in Israel proper. Had the 67 lines still been Israel's borders, there would have been no margine for error and while it is possible Israel still could have won, it would have been at a much higher cost in lives (not to mention that Jordan would have most likely joined in as well).

The 67 lines aren't technically indefensible (especially if they are accompanied by a region-wide peace treaty) but they do make it much more difficult for Israel to second guess itself. 

It's like the situation with Iran; Israel doesn't have the luxury of being wrong on this issue, which is why so many people think Israel will eventually try to destroy its nuclear program militarily. If Israel were to return to the 67 lines, the IDF would always be on a hair-trigger, just in case something changed, which could lead to Israel into needless preemptive action, upending a peace agreement and sending us back in time.

Israel and the Arab Spring

Ever since the Arab Spring made its way to Syria, there have been many people, both politicians and bloggers (I actually really like this blogger, I just wish she liked Israel a little more, or at all), who have been asserting that Israel does not want to see a truly democratic Syria. What's more, they have claimed that Israel is actively lobbying Washington not to abandon Assad or side with the protestors.

It was in this context that Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman openly lamented the lack of Western pressure on both Syria and Iran. He essentially called on NATO to actively intervene and support the protesters in both countries as it is doing in Libya.

Now, one can make the claim that the minister is only saying this cover Israel's tracks or he is simply trying to gain sympathy points by calling for something he knows won't happen. But I disagree.

It won't surprise any of my readers to hear that I am no big fan of Lieberman, but on this case I agree with him and I take him at his word. The West should be supporting homegrown pro-democracy movements in the Arab world and Iran (and everywhere else for that matter).

Why?

Because democracies, however antagonistic, don't fight each other.

Because Israel now sees that the peace treaties it made with the dictators of Egypt and Jordan are inherently flawed since they are not shared by their people.

Because in order to have real peace with its Arab neighbors, their governments must be truly representative of their people.

Because democracy is the right of all people and supporting it should be a goal in and of itself.

Israel made the mistake of maintaining its support for Mubarak up to the end and is not likely to make the same mistake again so soon. Especially not for someone who has refused to make peace at every turn, who actively arms and trains Hezbollah, and who arms and shelters Hamas. This is not a someone Israel needs or wants in power.

The people want the downfall of the regime!

The Israeli Peace Initiative

A new peace initiative was released today by former Mossad and Shin Bet Chiefs, IDF General and MKs. It is designed to be a response to the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 and is intended to prode Netanyahu into action before a possible vote on Palestinian Statehood in the UNGA in September.

The Israeli Peace Initiative (as it is referred to) is both bold and vague, addressing not just the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but the conflicts with Syria and Lebanon as well. Granted, it is not supposed to be used as a final status agreement, but merely as a means by which to help all the parties involved reach such an agreement. The full text of the Initiative (sorry for the long sentences but that's how it was written in Hebrew and I wanted to remain as close to the original while translating) is below, but first a few of my observations:

• The text refers to both Palestinian and Jewish refugees, though only discusses solutions for the former.
• It talks of "an Israeli withdrawal" but does not say "complete" or "full," in the same manner in which UNSC Resolution 242 refers to a withdrawal "from territories" but not "from the or all territories."
• Recognition of Israel as a Jewish State and Palestine as a Palestinian State is required.
• An Arab minority is guaranteed "full equal civil rights" in Israel, but there is no mention of Jews in the Palestinian State or the rights they would enjoy.
• Jerusalem is to be divided along Jewish-Arab lines, with Israel keeping the Jewish Quarter of the Old City but not the Temple Mount.
• The Islamic Holy Places are to be under a "Muslim Waqf," but it doesn't say which one. It is currently under a Jordanian Waqf. Will Jordan transfer this to Palestine? Unclear.
• The Right of Return can only be realized in a Palestinian State and the territories to be transfered to it by Israel. Only a symbolic number of refugees will be allowed into Israel.
• "All elements in the region" are to be consulted in order to solve the refugee problem. The authors use the word "הגורמים" which can mean both "elements" (reference to Hamas?) or "responsible bodies/authorities" (reference to the Palestinian Authority since it isn't a state yet?) This needs to be clarified.
• It discusses both Syria and Lebanon and talk of the Arab and Muslim countries but never mentions the Arab League or the Organization of the Islamic Conference by name or any specific obligations they might have.

The following is my own translation of the Israeli Peace Initiative:

The Israeli Peace Initiative

6 April 2011 - Proposal

The State of Israel

• Declares that it is its strategic objective to obtain historic compromise leading to formal regional arrangements that would bring about an end to all claims and conflicts, achieve peace, security, economic growth in the Middle East, and fully normalized relations between Israel and all Arab and Islamic countries.
• Recognizes the suffering of the Palestinian refugees from 1948 and the suffering of the Jewish refugees from Arab countries, and recognizes the need to solve the problem of the Palestinian refugees by mutual agreement and realistic solutions.
• Believes that cooperation between all sides is vital to ensure that the Middle East enjoys economic prosperity, high environmental quality and a future of prosperity and welfare for all peoples.
• Appreciates the Arab Peace Initiative of March 2002 as a historic step by the Arab countries to achieve a breakthrough and make progress on a regional level, and offers this as a partner declaration since “a military solution to the conflict will not achieve peace nor guarantee security for all parties.”

Therefore, Israel accepts the Arab Peace Initiative as a framework for regional peace negotiations, and offers the Israeli Peace Initiative as a response, outlining Israel’s vision of final status arrangements, which will be achieved through negotiations with the representatives of Arab countries, the Palestinians and Israel based on the following principles:

1.    The Principle of Ending All Conflicts

The founding principle of a permanent settlement in the region is an Israeli withdrawal, security arrangements, normal relations and an end to all conflicts, taking the security considerations of all parties into account, including the challenges of water resources, demographic realities on the ground, and the special needs of the three great religions. In addition, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will be solved on the basis of Two States for Two Peoples: a State of Palestine as the nation-state of the Palestinian people and the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jews (within which there is an Arab minority who will have full equal civil rights as outlined in Israel’s Declaration of Independence). Based on these principles, Israel offers the following vision:

1A - Permanent-Status Parameters to Settle the Israeli-Palestinian Issue

1. A Palestinian State – A sovereign, viable, and independent Palestinian State will be established in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from which Israel will withdraw. The Palestinian State will be demilitarized with full rights and responsibilities for internal security forces. The international community will play an active roll in ensuring the security of the borders and in fighting terrorist threats.

2. Borders – The borders of Palestine will be based on the lines of 4 June 1967 with agreed upon alterations based on the following principles: creating territorial contiguity between the parts of the Palestinian state; land swaps on the ratio of 1:1 (which will not exceed more than 7% of the West Bank) with an area (to be determined according to the precise needs) to create a safe passageway between the West Bank and Gaza Strip which will be under de-facto Palestinian control.

3. Jerusalem – The Jerusalem area will include the two capitals of the two states. The line will be drawn in the following way: The Jewish neighborhoods will be under Israeli sovereignty; the Arab neighborhoods will be under Palestinian sovereignty; special arrangements will be introduced for the Old City, which will ensure inter alia that the Western Wall and Jewish Quarter will be under Israeli sovereignty; The Temple Mount will remain without any sovereignty (or “Under God’s Sovereignty”), additional special arrangements will be introduced in regards to Islamic Holy Places to be run by the Muslim Waqf, and the Jewish Holy Places or Interests will be run by Israel, and an Israeli-International monitoring committee will be established in order to realize these arrangements.

4. Refugees – Resolving the refugee issue will be achieved by mutual agreement between all elements in the region based on the following principles: a financial compensation package will be offered by the international community and Israel for refugees in the countries where they are residing; refugees who choose to return to their homes (as specified in UN resolution 194) could return only to the territories of the Palestinian State, except for a symbolic amount to be agreed upon.

1B - Permanent-Status Parameters to Settle the Israeli-Syrian Issue

1. Borders – Israel will withdraw from the Golan Heights and return to a border based on that from 4 June 1967 with adjustments, to be agreed upon, on a limited scale and territorial exchange ratio of 1:1, which will reflect the international border of 1923. The mutual agreement will be implemented in a number of phases, similar to the model applied in the Sinai, and for a time period not to exceed 5 years.

2. Security Arrangements – The sides will agree on a package of security arrangements, which will define (by mutual consent) the amount of land to be demilitarized on each side of the border and arrangements for the deployment of international peacekeeping forces.

1C - Permanent-Status Parameters to Settle the Israeli-Lebanese Issue

1. Borders – Israel and Lebanon will establish a permanent settlement based on Resolution 1701, under whose framework, Israel has already completed its withdrawal to the international border.

2. Lebanese Sovereignty – In addition to the full implementation of Resolution 1701, Lebanon will fully assert its sovereignty in its territory through the Lebanese Army.

1D – State of Peace

Each of the final status agreements that will be signed between Israel and the Palestinians, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon, the parties will implement the instructions of the United Nations Charter and the principles of International Law that govern relations between states in peacetime; they will resolve all disputes by peaceful means; they will develop good, neighborly relations of coordinating bodies in order to ensure sustainable security; they will refrain from threats or the use of force against one another, refrain from joining a coalition, organization or alliance of any kind that has military or security nature, involving a third party, whose goals or activities include aggression or other acts of military hostility against the other side.

2.    The Principle of Creating Regional Security

1.     The parties will establish regional security mechanisms for dealing with common dangers and threats from states, terrorist organizations, pirate gangs and guerrilla organizations, in order to ensure the peace and security of all nations in the region.

2.     The parties will establish regional frameworks of cooperation for fighting crime and dealing with environmental dangers.

3.    The Principle of Open Economic Cooperation Across the Region

Through extensive financial assistance from the international community, the parties will implement broad cooperative projects to ensure the stability, vitality, and prosperity of the region, and achieve the maximum utilization of energy and water resources for the benefit of all parties. These projects will contribute to improving transportation infrastructure, agriculture, industry, and regional tourism, which will help deal with rising unemployment in the region. In the future, the parties will work to establish a “Middle Eastern Economic Block” (which will invite all countries in the region to join), with the aim of achieving a special status for the Bloc with the European Union, the US and the entire international community.

4.    The Principle of Creating Normal Diplomatic Relations and Ties Across the Region

Israel, Arab lands and Islamic countries need to promote gradual steps towards the establishment of normal relations between them, in the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative – steps which will start with the launch of peace negotiations, with will gradually deepen, expand, and upgrade to the level of full normal relations (including diplomatic relations, open borders and economic ties) with the signing of permanent-status agreements in parallel to their implementation.

The Revolution Spreads

As the protests in Egypt continue to grow, other Arab leaders are growing afraid that their days authoritarian rule may be numbered as well.

The BBC has a very interesting article discussing this issue, though it notably doesn't discuss Saudi Arabia.

It's too early to say if the nacent protest movements in these countries will continue, grow, or what direction they will go in, but one thing is clear: Arab leaders are going to have a much more difficult time governing from now on.


Jordan




Jordanians are also protesting loudly against their government, calling for more democratic control of parliament, where most top positions are still appointed by Kind Abdullah. The King sacked his old cabinet  and appointed Marouf al-Bakhit - a former Prime Minister, Ambassador to Israel and Turkey and retired Major-General in the Army - as the new Prime Minister. However, opposition figures have accused him of corruption and election rigging in the past and don't seem to pleased with his reappointment.

Syria

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has so far been spared any real protests to his grip on power, however that could soon. Protesters are beginning or organize on Facebook and Twitter, calling for a "day of rage" like the ones in Egypt. It remains to be seen how big this protest will be, but I think that will be directly tied to the events in Egypt. If the Egyptian protesters are successful, Syrians will be more bold and come out in larger numbers, but if the Egyptian revolution is quashed by the army, Syrians will fear the same thing happening to them. It's not a science, but it's something to think about.

Yemen

Yemen's President Ali Abdullah Saleh, told protesters in his country that he would not seek another term or set up a political dynasty. He has done this specifically to try and get opposition forces to cancel their planned "day of rage." While this statement was well received, the protests have not been called off and with unemployment hovering around 35%, these statements and a few economic reforms aren't likely to tame the movement any time soon. Given Yemen's radical history and the actual power of Islamists there, revolution in Yemen should be watched very carefully.